Peace as governance? Critical challenges to power-sharing peace deals: Lessons for policymakers

This policy paper seeks to offer insights for policymakers regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the use of power-sharing in peace processes. It is based upon close studies in three countries with protracted armed conflicts and peace processes—Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Colombia—as well as comparative analysis of nearly thirty peace processes involving power-sharing elements since the end of the Cold War. Power-sharing should be understood as a broad strategy, comprising not only power-sharing as traditionally understood, involving political power-sharing, but also other governance incentives commonly offered to induce armed groups to negotiate peace agreements, and to implement peace agreements, such as resource-sharing, inclusion in security structures, and territorial autonomy. Close examination demonstrates that while these incentives often have appeal for armed groups, this appeal is often overrated, and may frequently generate institutional arrangements and political dynamics that are unstable in the medium to long term. A re-evaluation of this strategy is sorely needed, as it is commonly deployed relatively uncritically, and power-sharing and similar incentives can often reify existing cleavages in societies, increasing rather than decreasing the risk of conflict. Specifically, power-sharing may import or embed social divisions that have the potential to become conflictual in new, weak, or dysfunctional institutions of governance that are not prepared to manage them

A Curse Not Limited to Cambodia

Brinkley’s piece draws welcome attention to the virtual farce of hybrid justice now underway in Cambodia, although the emphasis of the piece on the prevalence of corruption de-emphasizes a broader point: human rights protections are not respected in Cambodia, and serious accountability for the abuses by the Khmer Rouge or any subsequent abuses are unlikely, not merely because leaders are corrupt, but because the wide scale culture of impunity makes the protection of human rights and functional rule of law virtually impossible

The Prosecutor of the ICC: Too Political, Not Political Enough, or Both?

Much of the criticism of the behavior of the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, revolves around two apparently contradictory criticisms, although both may well be true: that he is too political, and that he is not political, or politically savvy, enough. Certainly, his rush to pursue high-profile indictments, contemporaneous with his pursuit of the “low-hanging fruit” (supposedly easy cases such as that of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo), suggest a prosecutor with sharp political instincts and a recognition of the need for a new institution to have a few “quick wins.” Yet, simultaneously, his blundering approach with respect to investigations and prosecutions arising from Darfur, and insistence in the context of the debates over the appropriateness of pursuing indictments of leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army during active peace negotiations that his job was a legal one, rather than a political one, suggests the opposite

Looking Forward, Backward, or Just Away?

The declassification and leaking of the so-called “torture memos” only supplements much which was already publicly well-known, but has offered a fresh opportunity to frankly debate American values, in particular its commitment to the rule of law, its own constitution, and international human rights and humanitarian law obligations to which it has committed itself, and which the Supreme Court has confirmed are part of domestic law. It is a shame, therefore, that the debate has been so stunted, diverted by the red herring of Dick Cheney’s rantings, and the apparent willingness of a segment of the population to accept, first, without evidence, that torture and other illegal activities have actually generated valuable intelligence that has thwarted potential attacks, and, second, that the rule of law and our core values can simply be suspended when they appear to be inconvenient. This includes, apparently, not only international legal obligations, but obligations under the Constitution, and clear guidance formally embedded in military training through the documents such as the US Army Field Manual dealing with human intelligence gathering

A breakthrough in justice? Accountability for post-election violence in Kenya

The International Criminal Court (ICC) provides the most promising, and potentially only, venue for accountability for those most responsible for serious post-election violence in Kenya. • International scrutiny, specifically the involvement of Kofi Annan and diplomatic pressure, sought to promote a resolution to violence and gave weight to the recommendations of a domestic commission of inquiry, but were unable to ensure domestic or hybrid accountability proceedings. • The ICC is expected by many in Kenya and beyond to pursue positive complementarity— that is, to have a significant impact on domestic accountability and the fight against impunity in the country. • The approval of the investigation into the situation in Kenya turned on a determination that crimes likely to be tried were not being investigated or tried in Kenya, and that they were of sufficient gravity to merit ICC scrutiny. • It will be difficult to ensure that ICC proceedings are accessible to the population, but potential for impact of the trials in Kenya depends on this. • Both case selection and the approach to timing and publicity of arrest warrants are sensitive politically. • Though the new Kenyan constitution, approved in a referendum in August 2010, might help prevent political violence in the future, serious and sustained efforts will be required to avoid tragic scenarios around the 2012 elections and beyond

Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding: Considerations for policymakers

It is critical to take into account the ways in which policies and programming in peacebuilding and transitional justice may be not only contradictory but also complementary. This brief examines the interaction of the following peacebuilding activities with transitional justice processes: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Re-integration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR) and rule of law promotion

Just peace? Peacebuilding and rule of law in Africa: Lessons for policymakers

This policy paper encapsulates the key findings of a research project undertaken by the Centre on Human Rights in Conflict (CHRC) of the University of East London School of Law on rule of law in African countries emerging from violent conflict, funded by the British Academy. The CHRC commissioned a range of experts and practitioners from around the world to examine and assess contemporary international efforts at promoting rule of law reform in peacebuilding operations and development assistance. Country studies examined in depth the experiences of a number of African countries—the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Sudan—while thematic studies examined rule of law as part of peacebuilding in comparative perspective, the role of traditional justice, and specific aspects of rule of law in the African context. These studies will be published as a book entitled Just Peace? Peacebuilding and rule of law in Africa

Mapping the nexus of transitional justice and peacebuilding

This paper explores the convergences and divergence between transitional justice and peace-building, by considering some of the recent developments in scholarship and practice. We examine the notion of ‘peace’ in transitional justice and the idea of ‘justice’ in peacebuilding. We highlight that transitional justice and peacebuilding often engage with similar or related ideas, though the scholarship on in each field has developed, largely, in parallel to each other, and of-ten without any significant engagement between the fields of inquiry. We also note that both fields share other commonalities, insofar as they often neglect questions of capital (political, social, economic) and at times, gender. We suggest that trying to locate the nexus in the first place draws attention to where peace and justice have actually got to be produced in order for there not to be conflict and violence. This in turn demonstrates that locally, ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ do not always look like the ‘peace’ and ‘justice’ drawn up by international donors and peace-builders; and, despite the ‘turn to the local’ in international relations, it is surprising just how many local and everyday dynamics are (dis)missed as sources of peace and justice, or potential avenues of addressing the past